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INTRODUCTION
The Buddhist four alternatives are often referred to
by their Sanskrit name catu.sko.ti, and given in the
form that something is, is not, both is and is not,
neither is nor is not, with observation that each of
these terms may be denied. As we proceed we shall
see that this is not the only manner of presenting a
catu.sko.ti. Since so many authorities and scholars
of ancient and modern times have discussed this
cardinal matter. sometimes heatedly, it is not
possible to deal with all the previous studies.
Certain discussions will be considered herein within
the scope of my five sections: I. The four
alternatives and logic, II. The four alternatives in
a disjunctive system, III. The four alternatives
applied to causation, each denied, IV. The four
alternatives applied to existence, each denied, V.
The three kinds of catu.sko.ti, various
considerations.
My findings differ from the Western treatments
that have come to my notice, and the differences
stem from my current preparations for publication of
a translation of a Tibetan work that deals in
several places with the formula.(1) In fact,
Tso^n-kha-pa's separation of the causation and
existence aspects of four alternatives, each denied,
goes back to Atii`sa (11th century), who in his
Bodhimaarga-pradiipa-pa~njikaa-naama presents four
ways of realizing insight (praj~naa), as follows:(2)
1) the principle that denies existence by four
alternatives discussed in section IV herein).
2) the principle called 'diamond grain'
(vajraka.na). He illustrates this in his text by
Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa (M.K.), I. 1, with
alternatives applied to causation (discussed in
section III herein).
3) the principle free from singleness and
multiplicity. He appeals to such an author as
`Saantideva (especially his Bodhicaryaavataara,
Chap. IX).
4) the principle of Dependent Origination (pratiit-
yasamutpaada). Here he means, for example, that the
dharmas arise dependently and are void of self-
existence.
Atii`sa's classification is revealing of the
meditative use put to the denial of four
alternatives when applied to causation or to
existence. The fact, then, that his listing does not
allude to the disjunctive system of the four
alternatives that I discuss in section II, may be
simply because this system was not put to meditative
use.
The two topics of causation and existence relate
to Buddhist teachings that are essentially distinct.
Thus, in Buddhism the problem of how a Tathaagata or
Buddha arises by reason of merit and knowledge, that
is, the problem of cause, is distinct from the
problem of the existence, for example, of the
Tathaagata after death. Naturally, the causal topic
is first, since a Tathaagata has to have arisen
before there is a point to inquiring whether he
exists after death. Historically, the first topic
represents what the Buddha preferred to talk about,
and
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the second topic includes matters which the Buddha
sometimes refused to talk about.
As suggested earlier, my main sources are from
Asian languages. I am also indebted to certain
Western writers, namely, Hermann Weyl for the
limitations of symbolic systems, Bernard Bosanquet
for treatment of disjunctive statements, and Willard
Van Orman Quine for his use of the word "logic"
(bibliography herein).
I. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC
Jayatilleke says, "there is little evidence that
Naagaarjuna understood the logic of the four
alternatives as formulated and utilized in early
Buddhism."(3) This scholar was not content with
putting down Naagaarjuna, founder of the Maadhyamika
school, for he concludes that scarcely any Western
scholars, classical Indian scholars, or modern
Indian and Japanese writers have comprehended this
logic either. Richard H. Robinson, one of the
Western scholars whose theories on the matter were
rejected for the most part by Jayatilleke,
subsequently replied to him,(4) among other things
questioning the use of the word "logic" to refer to
the four alternatives, although himself having
written an article entitled, "Some Logical Aspects
of Naagaarjuna's System, "(5) which included a
discussion of the four alternatives, and himself
having a section entitled "Naagaarjuna's Logic" in
his book (Early Maadhyamika...).(6) Chatalian, in
turn, asserts that Robinson did not justify his use
of the word' logic" in his book.(7) While agreeing
with Chatalian thus far, I still am puzzled by a
seeming overattention by Robinson and Chatalian to
other persons' uae of the word "logic." Quine points
out that while writers have used the term "logic"
with varying scope, a common part of their usage is
called "the science of necessary inference,"
although he admits that this is a vague
description.(8) He then states that it is less vague
to call logical certain locutions, including `if',
`then', `and', `or', `not', `unless', `some', `all',
`every', `any', `it', etc. Further more, he
mentions that a set pattern of employing these
locutions allows us to speak of the logical
structure. This is tantamount to saying that every
grammatical English sentence in the indicative mood
has a logical structure. Then, when Naagaarjuna
writes (Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XVIII, 8) , in an
English translation, "all is genuine or is not
genuine..." this has a logical structure. Indeed,
every statement with the pattern, "Every X is an a
or a b," has the same logical structure. Quine
further qualifies a statement as logically true if
its logical structure alone yields truth; and thus
his use of the term "logic" involves truth and
falsehood in this sense. Other writers have used
such terms as "formally valid, " "analytic
proposition," or "tautology" as closely related to
this usage of "logic."(9) Accordingly, the
application of symbolic logic to Naagaarjuna's
statements, to prove them logically true or false,
goes along with such a title as "the logic of the
four alternatives"; and this application of symbolic
logic has been engaged in by H. Nakamura, Robinson,
Jayatilleke, R. S. Y. Chi,
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among others, including Shohei Ichimura in his
recent dissertation. "A Study on Naagaarjuna's
Method of Refutation." It does seem that both
Jayatilleke and Robinson were justified in using the
term "logic" in a study of these matters when they
employed symbolic logic.
This still leaves the important problem of
whether Naagaarjuna's statements are indeed
logically ture, and thus have truth or falseness
according to their logical structure regardless of
content, regardless of what is given. By "given,"
what is meant here is the usual 'granted, assumed'.
This involves a problem of translation, because when
Naagaarjuna's statements are assumed to be at hand,
the mere fact that there are marks on a page in the
English language purported to be his statements does
not prove that they faithfully relay Naagaarjuna's
intention by marks on a page in the original
Sanskrit language. Here there are two points: If the
statements do not have an easily isolated logical
structure, it is hazardous and probably
contraindicated to apply symbolic logic. Even if
they do have an easily isolated logical structure,
one asks if they are also so complicated that one
requires a symbolic representation to sift or show
truth and falsehood.
We may start to solve this problem with its two
points, by recourse to Weyl's remarks regarding
"constructive cognition":(10) "By the introduction
of symbols the assertions are split so that one part
of the [mental] operations is shifted to the symbols
and thereby made independent of the given and its
continued existence. Thereby the free manipulation
of concepts is contrasted with their application,
ideas become detached from reality and acquire a
relative independence." Thus Weyl, an eminent
mathematician, is frank to admit that the pure
operations of mathematics are independent of the
existence of the given. In the case of the
catu.sko.ti, the given is a rather considerable
corpus of material in the Paali scriptures and then
in Naagaarjuna's works, not to speak of
contributions by later Asian authors. And there is
the assumption that this corpus is at hand in a
translated form of English sentences that are
susceptible, in whole or part, of being converted
from their natural form to the artificial language
of a symbolic system.
Now to the first point. Let us assume that the
catu.sko.ti statements do not have an isolatable
logical structure, and yet symbolic logic is
utilized. If one would grant the applicability of
Weyl's remarks, even if there were a valid
utilization of symbolic logic, it could not account
for the full corpus of the given, as the "given" has
been explicated earlier. So it may be merely a
section or subset of the given whose logical
structure is not isolatable. But then the
application of symbolic logic is a matter of
mastering the art of the symbols. And so one may
presume that it is an arrogated comprehension of the
given--although in fact the symbols are independent,
partially or wholly, of the given --whereby an
undeniably brilliant writer as Jayatilleke takes the
stance that he virtually alone understands "the
logic of the four alternatives," while claiming
that such a renowned author as Naagaarjuna cannot
understand it! Or
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claiming that a modern writer like Robinson cannot
understand, because he does not apply the formal
symbolic system right, that is, has not mastered the
art. Thus the symbolic system becomes a vested
interest, the users jealous of its misuse, while
they champion its misapplication to the given, and
even to what may not be at hand, for example, a
correct translation of a passage from an ancient
text.
Then to the second point. I do not propose to
denigrate, in general, the employment of symbolic
systems for representing propositions of Indian
philosophy. But are the catu.sko.ti statements so
complicated that a symbolic restatement is
necessary, with the implication of an understanding
already at hand to certify the necessity? Perhaps
there is working a psychological factor which could
be called "wonder." What mathematics student getting
the "right answer" with calculus has not at times
felt a wonder at the ability of the
mathematics--beyond his native capacities--say, to
determine the intercepted volume of the cone. As
Buytendijk has been cited: "Wonder is characterized
by a halting of the thing observed. This halting,
which men call attention, is at the same time
permeated by a premonition that light may be shed on
this thing."(11) But this premonition of light
through the symbolic system is a will-o'-the-wisp, a
subtle infatuation. Because light can only be shed
on the given, and the symbolic system is
independent, in whole or part, of the given as it
has been described earlier. It is like a person
fascinated by a brilliant lamp and therefore is not
seeing anything illumined by the lamp. The master of
the art is himself mastered and uses the symbolism
willy-nilly: even for the simplest computation, he
needs the computer. For centuries the Buddhists
believed that the given of the four alternatives,
including the traditional exegesis, provides
sufficient material for understanding--if a person
can understand. Some of the modern writers have
rendered the discussions into an artificial
language, and then have dwelt on false issues of
whether this or that scholar's formulation is a
"logic."
II. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES IN A DISJUNCTIVE SYSTEM
Here by a "disjunctive system" is meant a system of
statements subject to the judgment "A is either B or
C." Either B or C is left and one of these two is
excluded. Such a judgment appears to be involved in
the Indian syllogism, whose 'reason' (hetu) is
relevant to the, thesis' (saadhya) when the case
referred to in the thesis is agreed to be present in
similar cases and absent in dissimilar cases.(12)
Anyway, the disjunctive judgment is a form of
inference (anumaana), and for a particular system
it is necessary to state the rule of the disjunction.
Jayatilleke has shown that various systems of four
alternatives found in the early Buddhist texts are
in a disjunctive system whose rule seems to be that
when one of the alternatives is taken as "true" the
rest are certainly false. He points to such systems
as, "A person is wholly happy;.... unhappy;...both
happy and unhappy;...neither happy nor unhappy." "X
is a person who
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torments himself;... torments others;... both
torments himself as well as others,...who neither
torments himself nor others."(13) Bosanquet has an
apt illustration:(14) "I suppose that the essence of
such a system lies in arrangements for necessarily
closing every track to all but one at a time of any
tracts which cross it or converge into it. The track
X receives trains from A, B, C, D; if the entrance
for those from A is open, B, C, and D are ipso facto
closed; if A, B, and C are closed, D is open, and so
on."
But the matter is not without complications. The
Paali work Kathaavatthu records a dispute between
the two Buddhist sects Theravaada and Andhaka about
the nature of the meditative state which is called
in Paali nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana (the base of
neither the sa~n~naa nor non-sa~n~naa) , where
sa~n~naa means something like "idea, " and the
disagreement was over the presence or absence of
sa~n~naa in that state. The section concludes with
an appeal to the case of the "neutral feeling" (the
neither-pleasure-nor-pain), thus consistent with the
traditional Indian syllogism which uses, as example,
something well known to society (lokaprasiddha).
Just as it would not be cogent to ask if that
neutral feeling were either pleasure or pain, so is
it not proper to assert there either is or is not
sa~n~naa on the basis of neither the sa~n~naa nor
non-sa~n~naa.(15) This conclusion agrees with the
previous observation that only one of the four
alternatives is the case at a particular time.
Besides, we learn that the "neither... nor"
alternative points to a neutrality with
indeterminate content.
Jayatilleke quite properly explains the third
alternative: "S is partly P and partly non-P."(16)
Thus for the content of the third alternative,
stated as "the universe is both finite and
infinite." the Brahma-jaala Sutta explains this as
when one has the idea (sa~n~naa) that the world is
finite in the upward and downward directions, and
has the idea that the world is infinite across. In
agreement, Naagaarjuna states in his
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XXVII, 17-18:
If the same place (ekade`sa) that is divine were the
same place that is human, it would be (both)
permanent and impermanent. That is not feasible. If
`both the permanent and the impermanent' were
proven, one must also grant that the pair 'neither
the permanent nor the impermanent' is proven.
One should note about this passage (Jayatilleke
mistranslates and misunderstands it) , (17) that
Naagaajuna does not here deny an alternative of
"both the permanent and the impermanent'' per se; he
denies this for one and the same place. This can be
illustrated by his own verse (MK XXV, 14, cited
later), implying that nirvaa.na is present in the
Buddha and absent in ordinary persons, but not
present and absent in the same place. Naagaarjuna,
in the present verses (XXVII, 17-18), also makes
explicit his position that the fourth alternative
(neither the permanent nor the impermanent) is
derived from the third one, and that the third one
(both the permanent and the impermanent) combines
the presumed first one (the permanent) and the
second one (the impermanent).
This brings up Naagaarjuna's remarkable verse
(MK XVIII, 8):
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All (sarva) is genuine (tathyam),(18) or is not
genuine, or is both genuine and not genuine, or is
neither genuine nor not-genuine. That is the ranked
instruction (anu`saasana) of the Buddha.
According to Candrakiirti's commentary "all" means
the personality aggregates (skandha), the realms
(dhaatu), and the sense bases (aayatana).(19) See,
along the same lines, Kalupahana's discussion(20)
about the "Discourse on 'Everything'" (Sabbasutta),
available both in the Paali canon and in the AAgama
version in Chinese translation. Therefore the word
"all" in Naagaarjuna's verse amounts to "anything,"
where the "anything" is any entity chosen from the
set of 'all' entities according to the Buddhist
meaning, as just expounded. This agrees with
Bosanquet's observation that the content of the
disjunctive judgment "A is either B or C" "is
naturally taken as tin individual, being necessarily
concrete."(21)
Next, the interpretation of the word anu`saasana
as 'ranked instruction' comes from observing it
among the three 'marvels' (praatihaarya) of the
Buddha's teaching, of which the first one is
`magical performance' (.rddhi), the second is `mind
reading' (aade`sanaa) , and the third. 'ranked
instruction' (anu`saasana), apparently made possible
by the preceding 'mind reading'.(22) This
interpretation is confirmed in Vasubandhu's
Buddhaanusm.rti-.tiikaa, saying in part, "... with
the three kinds of marvels observing the streams of
consciousness of the noble `Saariputra, and so on,
and of other fortunate sentient beings, teaches the
true nature of the `Sraavakayaana exactly according
to their expectations and their potentialities."(23)
This only clarifies why Candrakiirti's commentary on
the verse interprets it as a ranking, and not why
his commentary interprets the ranking as follows:
(a) The Buddha taught to worldly beings the
personality aggregates, the realms, and sense bases,
with their various enumerations, in a manner that
'all is genuine' in order to lead them onto the path
by having them admire his omniscience about all
these elements. (b) After these beings had come to
trust the Lord, it was safe to inform them about all
those divisions of the world that 'all is not
genuine', i.e. `all is spurious', because they
momentarily perish and change. (c) Certain select
disciples could be told `all is both genuine and
not-genuine'. That is, that the same element which is
genuine to the ordinary person is not-genuine or
spurious to the noble person who is the Buddha's
disciple. He tells them this, so they may become
detached, i.e, not see it in just one way. (d) To
certain advanced disciples, far progressed in
viewing reality and scarcely obscured, he taught
that 'all is neither genuine nor not-genuine', just
as in the case of the son of a barren woman, one
asserts that the son is neither white nor black (=
non-white).(24)
However, he seems to be following, in his own way,
the four 'allegories' or 'veiled intentions'
(abhisa.mdhi) which are listed and then defined in
the Mahaayaana-Suutraala.mkaara, XII,16-17.(25) The
first one is avataara.na-abhi (the veiled intention
so they will enter), explained as teaching that
form, and so forth, is existent, so as not to scare
the `sraavakas from entering the Teaching. The
second one is lak.sa.na-abhi (the veiled intention
about the character, namely, of
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dharmas), explained as teaching that all dharmas are
without self-existence, without origination, etc.
The third one is pratipak.sa-abhi (the veiled
intention about opponents, namely, to faults) ,
explained as teaching by taking into account the
taming of faults. So far these terms agree quite
well with Candrakiirti's exposition. For example, in
the case of the third one, the application to
Naagaarjuna's line "all is both genuine and
not-genuine" is the opposition (pratipak.sa) to the
fault of one-sidedness. It is the fourth one whose
relevance is obscure: this is the pari.naamana-abhi
(the veiled intention about changeover, namely, to
reality) . In illustration, the Suutraala.mkaara
cites a verse: "Those who take the pithless as
having a pith abide in waywardness. Those who are
mortified with the pains [of austere endeavor]
[abide] in the best enlightenment." Candrakiirti is
at least partially consistent by saying "to certain
advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing
reality," because these ones would take the pithless
as pithless.
Jayatilleke(26) refers to the same passage of
Candrakiirti's and to a different commentary on
Naagaarjuna's verse in the
Praj~naapaaramitaa`saastra, both as presented in
Robinson's book,(27) to deny that in the verse cited
above, the four alternatives are in a "relation of
exclusive disjunction" and to claim that they amount
to the non-Buddhist relativistic logic of the Jains.
However, Candrakiirti's commentary is consistent
with Naagaarjuna's MK XXVII, 17-18 (translated
earlier, herein) concerning the dependence of the
subsequent alternative on the previous one or ones.
Jayatilleke's hostility to Candrakiirti's
commentary on the verse may stem from the modern
Theravaadin's reluctance to attribute a ranked
instruction to the Buddha. Ordinarily the canonical
passage cited in this connection is, as Thomas
renders it: "Buddha replied, 'What does the Order
expect of me? I have taught the Doctrine without
making any inner and outer, and herein the
Tathaagata has not the closed fist of a teacher with
regard to doctrines.'"(28) From the modern
Theravaadin standpoint, Candrakiirti's explanation
attributes to the Buddha precisely such an inner and
outer, because it portrays the Buddha teaching
worldly beings (= the outer) in the realistic
manner, and then teaching those beings once they had
become disciples (= the inner) in the illusional
manner. And going on with a still different teaching
to certain advanced disciples. But that same
scriptural passage from the traditional, last sermon
of the Buddha could be taken differently than it
usually is, and perhaps consistently with
Naagaarjuna's verse as Candrakiirti understood it.
That is because the original Paali (Diigha-Nikaaya,
ii, 100) reads: mayaa dhammo anantara.m abaahira.m
karitvaa (By me was the Dhamma preached without
inner, without outer). The phrase "without inner,
without outer" can be restated as "with neither an
inner nor an outer." And then just as the "neutral
feeling" (neither pleasure nor pain) is not either
pleasure or pain, so also one could not determine if
the Buddha's doctrine was either inner or outer, and
one homogeneous character, wearisome by repetition
of the same doctrine over and over again.
Naagaarjuna's
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verse, by use of the word anu`saasana, seems to mean
that the Tathaagata, without the closed fist, would
gladly communicate in a graduated manner so that
disciples in different stages of progress could have
a teaching suited to their particular level. While
this position may not be agreeable to some modern
exponents of the Theravaada tradition, it is not a
'Mahaayaana' quarrel with the earlier 'Hiinayaana'
school, because also Buddhaghosa of the Theravaada
tradition in his Atthasaalinii insists that the
Buddha's teaching was fittingly modified in
accordance with the varying inclinations of both men
and gods.(29)
III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO CAUSATION,
EACH DENIED
Starting with the Buddha's first sermon, the four
Noble Truths have been a basic ingredient of
Buddhist thinking and attitudes. Of these Truths,
the first is the Noble Truth of Suffering; and of
the fourth Truth, the Noble Truth of Path explained
with eight members, the first member is called
'right views' (samyag-d.r.s.ti). Sometimes 'right
views' were established by determining and
eliminating the wrong views. So in the Paali
Sa.myutta-Nikaaya (II, 19-21) , (30) the Buddha,
replying to questions by Kassapa (Kaa`syapa), denied
that suffering is caused by oneself, by another, by
both oneself and another, or neither by oneself nor
by another. Then, in answer to further questions,
the Buddha stated that he knows suffering and sees
it. Then Kassapa asked the Buddha to explain
suffering to him, and was told that claiming the
suffering was done by oneself amounts to believing
that one is the same person as before, which is the
eternalistic view; while claiming that the
experiencer of the suffering is different from the
one who caused it, amounts to the nihilistic view.
Thereupon the Buddha taught the Dharma by a mean,
namely, the series of twelve members which begin
with the statement `having nescience as condition
the motivations arise' and continue with similar
statements through the rest of dependent origination
(pratiitya-samutpaada) . The Buddha proceeded to
teach that by the cessation of nescience, the
motivations cease, and so on, with the cessation of
this entire mass of suffering. In agreement,
Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, I, 1 states:
There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself,
from another, from both (itself and another), or by
chance.
In this case the given element is called the
'entity' (bhaava). The first two of the denied
alternatives have the given element of 'cessation'
(nirodha) in MK VII, 32. The element is 'suffering'
(du.hkha) or 'external entity' (baahya-bhaava) in MK
XII. The meaning of the denial here is aptly stated
by Bosanquet: "Negation of a disjunction would mean
throwing aside the whole of some definite group of
thoughts as fallacious, and going back to begin
again with a judgment of the simplest kind. It
amounts to saying, 'None of your distinctions touch
the point; you must begin afresh.'"(31) In the
discourse to Kassapa, to begin afresh amounts to
accepting "dependent origination." This is also
Naagaarjuna's
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position, following the ancient discourse to
Katyaayana, as mentioned later in the
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, and as stated in Candrakiirti's
Madhyamakaavataara, VI, 114:
Since entities do not arise by chance, (i.e.) from a
lord, and so on (primal matter, time, atoms,
svabhaava, Puru.sa, Naaraayana, etc.) , or from
themselves, others, or both (themselves and others),
then they arise in dependence (on causes and
conditions).(32)
Besides, to begin afresh amounts to the
establishment of voidness (`suunyataa), for so the
Anavatapta (naagaraaja) parip.rcchaa is cited: "Any
(thing) that is born (in dependence) on conditions,
is not born (to wit): The birth of this (thing) does
not occur by self-existence (svabhaava). Any (thing)
that is dependent on conditions, is declared void.
Any person who understands voidness, is
heedful."(33) Since Naagaarjuna begins his
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa with this theory of causation,
it is reasonable to assume that it is essential for
the rest of his work. Also, since voidness
(`suunyataa) is established in the course of the
causal denials, it is taken for granted in the
denial in terms of existence, and so the attempt to
establish voidness by way of existence becomes a
faulty point of view (d.r.s.ti), as in MK XXII, 11:
One should not say "It's void." nor "It's non-void,"
nor "It's both (void and non-void), " nor "It's
neither." But it may be said in the meaning of
designation.
One should not say, "It's void," because the four
alternatives applied to existence cannot establish
voidness. But in the meaning of designation
(praj~naptiartham), as in the celebrated verses (MK
XXIV, 18-19), there is the act of calling dependent
origination 'voidness' and the dharmas so arising
'void'; and here Naagaarjuna adds that the act of
calling, when there is the dependency, is the middle
path.(34)
Besides, the denial of the four alternatives in
the scope of causation (confer, MK I, 1, earlier)
was aimed at four philosophical positions, as
follows:(35)
1. The denial of arising from itself is the
rejection of the Saa.mkhya position, which is the
satkaaryavaada (causation of the effect already
existent) . Murti is certainly right on this
point.(36)
2. The denial of arising from another rejects
the creator being (ii`svara) , and Kalupahana
increases the list from a Jaina source for 'caused
by another': destiny (niyati), time (kaala), God
(ii`svara), nature (svabhaava), and action (karma).
The later Buddhist logicians held a theory of
'efficiency' that belongs here.(37) Murti
incorrectly puts this kind of denial under the
heading of asatkaaryavaada (the nonexistence of an
effect before its production).(38)
3. The denial of arising from both itself and
another is the rejection of the Vai`se.sika, who say
the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the
potter, wheel, sticks, etc. In fact, this theory is
in both the Nyaaya and Vai`sesika philosophy, which
Dasgupta,(39) in agreement with Shastri,(40) calls
the asatkaaryavaada, the opposite of the Saa.mkhya's
satkaaryavaada. Here, the clay is the material
cause; the stick, wheel, etc., the instrumental
cause.
4. The denial of arising without a cause (or by
chance), is the rejection of the Lokaayata (the
ancient materialistic school), which espouses the
arising
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from self-nature.(41) That school held that
consciousness is just a mode of the four elements
(fire, air, water, earth): consciousness is not the
effect of another consciousness.(42)
Hence, there is no denial of arising per se, but
the alternatives are meant to deny the arising
falsely ascribed to certain agencies, to wit,
itself, another, both itself and another, or by
chance. This, then, is one of the 'right views'.
V. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO EXISTENCE, EACH
DENIED
The Buddha rejected each of the four alternatives
regarding the existence after death of the
Tathaagata, because none of the four are relevant
(na upeti), or defined (avyaakata).(43) Naagaarjuna
devotes Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, chap. XXV to the same
topic, saying generally (XXV, 22): "Since all given
things (*vastu)(44) are void, what is endless, what
with end, what both endless and with end, what
neither endless or with end?" This refers to the
celebrated fourteen 'undefined given things'
(avyaak.rta-vastuuni) .(45) So in the chapter,
nirvaa.na is treated in verses 5, 8, 13, 16; and the
Lord before and after cessation, in verses 17, 18.
For example, this is verse 17; "One should not
infer(40) that the Lord exists after cessation (i.e.
in Nirvaa.na). One should not infer that he does not
exist, or both (exists and does not exist), or
neither." Hence the rejections, again, are aimed
against all philosophical positions that resort to
inference or to ordinary human reason in such
matters.(47) The failure of reasoning is clearly
expressed in the Mahaayaana work Ratnagotravibhaaga
(chap. I, verse 9) when denying the four
alternatives about the Dharma-sun as the ultimate
nature:
I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence and
not non-existence, not both existence and
non-existence, neither different from existence nor
from non-existence; which cannot be reasoned
(a`sakyas tarkayitum) , is free from definition
(nirukty-apagata.h), revealed by introspection, and
quiescent; and which, pervasively shining with
immaculate vision, removes the attachment,
antipathy, and (eye-) cauls toward all objects.(48)
The question arises whether it is proper to
interpret this to involve denial in Bosanquet's
meaning, what he calls "contrary negation";(49) "As
we always speak and think within a general subject
or universe of discourse, it follows that every
denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment
which it denies." One could argue that simply to
deny one judgment and thereby affirm another
judgment would be a process of thinking that is
negated by the goal alluded to in the preceding
passage, since the Dharma-sun "cannot be reasoned."
However, if Bosanquet's statement were altered to
read "every denial substitutes some affirmation for
the denial," it then appears to suit the state of
affairs alluded to in the passage above. In short,
the whole system of four alternatives would be
denied in this contrary negation, thus to suggest
the retirement of convention (sa.mv.rti) in favor of
absolute truth (paramaartha-satya).
In the preceding illustrations, it is the
Tathaagata or the Dharma or Nirvaa.na which is
affirmed as the affirmation of absolute truth in the
process of the
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denials, because these denials are a meditative
act--and acts succeed where theories fail--which
downgrades the role of inference and human reason
generally, and upholds the role of vision, so--as
Ati`sa indicated--to promote insight (praj~naa).
Therefore, it is now possible to evaluate two
interpretations which seem to be starkly contrasted:
(1) Murti's "The Maadhyamika denies metaphysics not
because there is no real for him; but because it is
inaccessible to Reason. He is convinced of a higher
faculty. Intuition (praj~naa)...."(50) (2) Streng's.
"In Naagaarjuna's negative dialectic the power of
reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate
Truth."(51) One could argue that the disagreement is
deceptive, since if reason is to be taken as the
mental process of making the denials which
substitute an affirmation of the Real or Ultimate
Truth, then indeed while the Real is inaccessible to
reason, it cannot be denied that reason brought
about that higher faculty, the supernal insight
(praj~naa), to which the Real is accessible. This
very point is made in the Kaa`syapa-parivarta:
"Kaa`syapa, it is this way: for example, when two
trees are rubbed together by the wind, and fire
arises (form the friction), (that fire) having
arisen, burns the two trees. In the same way,
Kaa`syapa, (when given things are analysed) by the
most pure discrimination (pratyavek.sa.naa), the
faculty of noble insight is born; and (that Fire)
having been born, (it) burns up that most pure
discrimination itself."(52)
Hence, the very discrimination which is the kind of
reasoning that denies the alternatives is described
metaphorically as a friction which arouses the fire
of insight that in turn destroys this kind of
reasoning.
Turning to Tso^n-kha-pa's section,(53) defending
the denial of the four alternatives, this concerns
the presence and absence of entities. Tso^n-kha-pa
states that there are only two possibilities for an
entity, that is, accomplished by own-nature, and
efficient. Then, if the first alternative is stated
in the form, "An entity exists." this is denied; the
denial meaning to the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika that,
in the case of both truths (sa.mv.rti and
paramaartha), one denies that an entity exists
accomplished by own-nature. while; the efficient
entity is denied in the paramaartha or absolute
sense but not conventionally.
Likewise, the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika rejects
the nonexistence of an entity, should someone affirm
the nonexistence of an entity accomplished by
own-nature among the unconstructed (asa.msk.rta)
natures (dharma).
Likewise, this Maadhyamika rejects the
simultaneity of existence of that sort of entity
with the nonexistence of the other sort of entity.
And he rejects that there are neither, even one
accomplished by own-nature.
While I have insisted that the ultimate nature
is affirmed by the four denials, it should be
granted that the acceptance of this absolute in
Naagaarjuna's Maadhyamika is a matter much disputed
by Western scholars; de Jong's thoughtful
article(54) on the topic deserves consultation. In
any case, Candrakiirti's position is clear, as he
states in his own commentary on the
Madhyamakaavataara:
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Regarding this sort of svabhaava (self-existence) as
written in particular (Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XV,
1-2), received from the mouth of the aacaarya (=
Naagaarjuna), does it exist? (In answer:) As to its
authorization, the Bhagavat proclaimed that whether
Tathaagatas arise or do not arise, this true nature
of dharmas abides, and so on, extensively. The "true
nature" (dharmataa) (of that text, = svabhaava)
(necessarily) exists. Which (elements) have this
"true nature"? These, the eye, etc. have this
svabhaava. And what is their svabhaava? Their
uncreate nature and their non-dependence on another;
the self-nature which is to be understood by
knowledge (in aaryasamaapatti) free from the caul of
nescience (and its associated habit-energy). When it
is asked. "Does that sort of thing exist?" who would
answer, "No."? If it does not exist, for which goal
do the Bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the
perfections? For what reason do the Bodhisattvas, in
order to comprehend the true-nature, assume myriads
of difficulties that way?(55)
In short, Candrakiirti explains the svabhaava of MK
XV, 1-2, as the "true nature" of the scriptures, and
in a manner equivalent to the dharma-sun of the
Ratnagotravibhaaga passage.(56)
Finally, the denials concerning existence are
also referred to as the rejection of four 'views'
(d.r.s.ti). So MK,XXVII, 13:
Thus whatever the view concerning the past, whether
'I existed', `I did not exist', `I both (existed and
did not exist)', `I neither (existed, nor did not
exist)', it is not valid.
Such passages undoubtedly support the frequent claim
that the Maadhyamika rejects all 'views'. But note
that the views here are of existence, not of
causation; and that Naagaarjuna elsewhere adheres to
the view of Dependent Origination, which in Buddhism
would be counted as a 'right view'
(samyag-d.r.s.ti).
V. THE THREE KINDS OF CATU.SKO.TI, VARIOUS
CONSIDERATIONS
It might be argued that there are not really three
'kinds' of catu.sko.ti but simply different
applications of the catu.sko.ti. Perhaps an
exaggeration of contrast is involved in using the
word `kinds'. Still I feel the word is necessary to
counter the frequent discussion of the catu.sko.ti
as though the catu.sko.ti is at hand and the only
difficulty is in how to explain it. Hence we may
observe that the first kind of catu.sko.ti, in a
disjunctive system, is explanatory of the individual
propositions, and thus serves as an introduction to
the next two kinds or uses of the catu.sko.ti, to
wit, to apply to the problem of causation or to the
problem of existence. There were disputes concerning
each of the three kinds, but it is especially the
causation and existence applications of the four
alternatives that occasioned spirited disagreements
between the two main schools of the Maadhyamika--the
Praasa^ngika and the Svaatantrika-disagreements
which would require too many technical explanations
to be treated in this article.
Moreover, all three kinds of catu.sko.ti are
found in early Buddhism and later in the Maadhyamika
school. The first case where the four alternatives
constitute a disjunctive system, with the individual
terms not necessarily
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denied, was well represented in passages of
early Buddhism. as preserved in the Paali canon; and
then was included in Naagaarjuna's
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa in the verse about the ranked
instruction of the Buddha. The second case, denial
of alternatives regarding causation, starting with
the discourses to Kassapa and to Kaccaayana, is made
much of by Naagaarjuna as the basis of the
Maadhyamika, but does not seem to have been stressed
as much in other schools of Buddhism. The third
case, denial of four alternatives, has important
examples in both early and later Buddhism, and, of
course, is generously treated in the Maadhyamika.
Therefore, when Jayatilleke says, "It is evident
that Naagaarjuna and some of his commentators,
ancient and modern, refer to this logic with little
understanding of its real nature and
significance, "(57) these remarks define the
limitations of Jayatilleke's own views of these
problems, outside of which is his own "little
understanding." Robinson answered Jayatilleke in a
different way: "And since the catu.sko.ti is not a
doctrine but just a form, later writers were at
liberty to use it in new ways, doing which does not
itself prove that they misunderstood the early
forms."(58) This is well stated and is meant not
only to reject Jayatilleke's criticism of
Naagaarjuna and others, but apparently also to
justify the application of symbolic logic. However,
I have brought up sufficient evidence to show that
Naagaarjuna, in the matter of the catu.sko.ti, is
heir to and the continuator of teachings in the
early Buddhist canon (in Paali, the four Nikaayas;
in Sanskrit, the four AAgamas). Furthermore, I
cannot concede that the catu.sko.ti is just a form.
Indeed, if Naagaarjuna had used it in new ways,
Jayatilleke would have been more justified in his
attribution of misunderstanding to Naagaarjuna.
Next, we observe by the foregoing materials that
the first kind of catu.sko.ti is a disjunctive
system that was used to explain the Buddha's
teaching. The second, applied to causation, each of
the alternatives denied, is a meditative exercise,
and besides serves to classify some of the
philosophical positions rejected by the Maadhyamika.
The third kind, applied to existence, each of the
alternatives denied, is another meditative exercise,
and besides serves to establish the absolute by
negating the notional activity of the mind
(sa.mj~naaskandha) and its net of imputed
qualifications.(59)
The priority of the causality to existence
treatments--as I have already insisted upon--is
consistent with Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa,
which devotes chapter I to conditional causes
(pratyaya) , beginning with the denial of four
alternatives concerning origination of entities, but
in the same chapter begins to treat alternatives of
existence, nonexistence, etc. So MK I,6: "Neither an
existent nor a non-existent entity has a valid
condition (pratyaya) . What non-existent has a
condition? What is the use of a condition for an
existent?" The next verse (I,7) shifts to the word
dharma: "Whenever a feature (dharma) neither
existent nor non-existent, or both existent and
non-existent, operates, in that case how could an
operator-cause be valid?" (and it is not valid.) MK
chapters III, IV, and V, deal with the products
causes, namely, the sense
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bases, personality aggregates, and elements, that
amount to "all entities" (sarva-bhaava, IV, 7). Here
again, "all entities" presuppose their arising as
products, so the causality. The establishment of
causality in conventional terms and of existence in
absolute terms is therefore implied in MK XXIV, 10:
"Without reliance on convention, the supreme
(paramaartha) is not pointed to."
I propose that it was by not distinguishing
these uses of the catu.sko.ti that there has been in
the past various improper or misleading attributions
to this formula. For example, there is the problem
of which kind of two negations is involved: the
prasajya-prati.sedha (negation by denial) or
paryudaasa-prati.sedha (negation by implication).
Matilal concludes that the catu.sko.ti is of the
prasajya type and that so understood the catu.sko.ti
is free from contradiction.(60) Staal after
admirably explaining the two kinds of negation (the
paryudaasa type negates a term; the prasajya type
negates the predicate) agrees with Matilal that the
catu.sko.ti exhibits the prasajya type, but
disagrees that this frees the formula of
contradiction.(61) However, when one considers this
along with my preceding materials, one can promptly
agree with Matilal and then with Staal that it is
the prasajya negation which is involved with the
catu.sko.ti, nota bene, the four alternatives in
their explicit form applied to existence, because
the proposition "I bow to that Dharma-sun which is
not existence" is of the prasajya type (confer,
Staal: `x is not F'). But when one examines the
propositions of the four alternatives in their
explicit form applied to causation, one can promptly
disagree with Matilal and then with Staal, because
the proposition "There is no entity anywhere that
arises form itself," is of the paryudaasa type
(confer, Staal: 'not-x is F'). And this paryudaasa
type is of the variety implying action, for which
there is the stock example, "Fat Devadatta does not
eat food in the daytime." But 'fat Devadatta' must
eat sometime, so when? The world responds, "at
night!"(62) Also, the entities that do not arise
from self, another, both, or by chance, must arise
somehow, so how? Buddhism responds. "in the manner
of Dependent Origination (pratiityasamutpaada)." In
illustration, the first two members of Dependent
Origination are: (1) `nescience' (avidyaa), and (2)
`motivations' (sa.mskaara). `Motivations' do not
arise from self (motivations) or from another
(nescience) , or from both self and another
(motivations and nescience), or without a cause
(that is, by chance); 'motivations' do arise with
'nescience' as condition (pratyaya) ; and since
'motivations' are a karma member, have a cause
(hetu) which is karma, hence the other karma-member,
which is (10) `gestation' (bhava) `re-existence'
(punarbhava).(63)
But then what of Staal's position that even so
(that is, allowing the prasajya interpretation for
the catu.sko.ti of existence), this does not save
the prasajya propositions from mutual contradiction?
Saying, "In rejecting the third clause, the denial
of the principle of non-contradiction is rejected,
not the principle of non-contradiction itself,"(64)
he interprets the third proposition in its literal
form, denial that something both exists and does not
exist. However, at least
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in the Tso^n-kha-pa Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika
explanation that I gave earlier, it is not possible
to understand the four denials in terms of existence
just by their literal form, because one must bring
in the theory of two truths (sa.mv.rti and
paramaartha) to understand Naagaarjuna's position.
In such a case, the denial of the third proposition
amounts in commentarial expansion to: This
Maadhyamika rejects, in the absolute sense
(paramaarthatas), the simultaneity of existence by
own-nature of that efficient entity with the
nonexistence by own-nature of the unconstructed
entity. In short, it is here claimed that
`existence' and 'non-existence' refer to contrasting
entities. Along the same lines, Naagaarjuna says (MK
XXV, 14):
How could Nirvaa.na be both a presence and an
absence? Like light and darkness, there is no
existence of the two in the same place,
Thus the third alternative of this type of
catu.sko.ti can be resolved in various ways, for
example, one may deny both a presence and an absence
of nirvaa.na, adding "that is, in the same place";
or, with a different subject, adding perhaps, "that
is, at the same time"; or, with still other
subjects, perhaps drawing upon the two truths, "that
is, with the same truth." All these additions are
consistent with Naagaarjuna's verses in the MK Thus,
in such interpretations it is not the intention of
the denial, as Staal claims, to save a principle of
human reason from default; but rather it is held
that such is really the meaning of the third
proposition, to wit, that a qualification of place,
time, or truth must be added. However, it follows
that the denials of alternatives applied to
existence, while in their explicit form constituting
the prasajya type of denial, turn out, by reason of
the qualifications added in the Maadhyamika school,
to be paryudaasa negations. Indeed, study of the two
main traditions of the Maadhyamika, Candrakiirti's
Praasa^ngika and Bhaavaviveka's Svaatantrika, will
show that both of them insist on adding
qualifications, especially in terms of the two
truths (sa.mv.rti and paramaartha) , their
disagreement stemming from how such qualifications
are made. But that a qualification should be added
is consistent with most of the attempts of
Westerners to explain the catu.sko.ti, because they
usually added something, to wit, their theory of the
catu.sko.ti. So the Maadhyamika commentators and the
Western writers share this solicitude to
rationalize, even in the case of the absolute, which
was supposed to cut off the net of qualifications.
Even so, as was indicated previously, the
Maadhyamika is not against reason as the faculty
which denies a self, denies the alternatives, and so
on, because this reason leads to the insight which
realizes the absolute.
CONCLUSION
Now we must revert to the initial question: Who
understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist
texts? It is easier to define the persons who do not
understand: as was shown, they are the ones who do
not want to understand, or are not confident of
their own ability to understand. Besides, no one
under-
P.18
stands the four alternatives, but perchance one does
understand the four alternatives in a disjunctive
system, or the four alternatives applied to
causetion, or the four alternatives applied to
existence. The four alternatives, disjunctively
considered, constitute a preliminary orientation.
The alternatives of causation, each denied, are a
meditation with upholding of human reason with its
inferences, definitions, and the like. The
alternatives of existence, each denied, are a
meditation with ultimate downgrading of human
reason, Then to answer more along the lines of the
way Candrakiirti writes: --Whether one who
understands arises or does not arise, "this true
nature of dharmas abides,"--the svabhaava of that
sort. So Candrakiirti says in his Prasannapadaa
commentary on Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, chapter XV:
By svabhaava ons understands this innate nature,
uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the
past, present, and future; which did not arise
earlier and will not arise later; which is not
dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat
of water, (one or another) of this side and the
other side, long and short. Well, then, does this
own-nature of fire that is of such manner (i.e.
uncreate, not dependent) exist? (In reply: ) This
(svabhaava of such sort) neither exists nor does not
exist by reason of own-nature. While that is the
case, still in order to avoid frightening the
hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such
as `It is svabhaava' and 'It is dharmataa') and say
it exists.(65)
NOTES
1. Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo, the sections
'Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real'. The
four-alternatives discussion occurs in the
'Discerning the Real' section.
2. The passage is in the Tibetan Tanjur, photo
edition, vol. 103, pp. 39-4-8 to 40-2-2.
3. K. N. Jayatilleke, "The Logic of Four
Alternatives," Philosophy East and West, 17: 1967):
82; hereafter cited as Jayatilleke, "Logic."
4. Richard H. Robinson, book review of
Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory. Philosophy East
and West 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1969): 72-81., see
especially 75-76; hereafter cited as Robinson,
book-review.
5. Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of
Naagaarjuna's System," Philosophy East and West 6,
no. 4 (Jan., 1957): 291-308.
6. Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in
India and China (Madison, Wise.: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1967) , pp. 50-58, hereafter
Robinson, Early Maadhyamika.
7. G. Chataliasn, "A Study of R. H. Robinson's
Early Maadhyamika in India and China, "Journal of
Indian Philosophy 1 (1972), section II, Logic and
Argument, pp. 315-325.
8. Willard Van Orman Quine, Elementary Logic
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 1-3.
9. Confer, Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of
Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 13; hereafter
cited as Weyl, Philosophy.
10. Weyl, Philosophy, pp. 37-38.
11. Cornelis Verhoeven, The Philosophy of Wonder,
trans. Mary Foran (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1967), p. 38.
12. Confer, Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic
(New York: Dover Publication, 1962), vol. 1, pp.
242-245.
13. Jayatilleke, "Logic," pp. 70-71.
14. Bernard Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic
(London: Macmillan and Co., 19-48) , p. 125;
hereafter Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic.
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15. Confer in translation of the Kathaavatthu.
Points of Controversy, by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs.
Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society. 1915), pp.
155-156. where the term sa~n~naa is rendered
'consciousness'.
16. Jayatilleke. "Logic," p. 79.
17. Ibid., p.82.
18. My rendition 'genuine' is close to the
dictionary. Confer, the negative forms atathya
('untrue, unreal') and avitatha ('not untrue, not
futile').
19. In translation, see J. W. de Jong, Cinq
chapitres dela Prasannapadaa (Paris: Paul Geuthner,
1949). p.27: "il a enseigne que ces agregats,
elements et bases... sent vrais." Hereafter cited as
de Jong Cinq chapitres.
20. D. J. Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on
Empiricism." Philosophy East and West 19, no. 1
(Jan., 1969): 65-67.
21. The Essentials of Logic, pp. 123-124.
22. See Franklin Edgerton. Buddhist Hybrid
Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 392, under praatihaarya.
Here the form anu`saasanii is used.
23. Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition, vol. 104, pp.
33-5-8 to 34-1-1:...' phags pa `Saa-ri'i bu la sogs
pa da^n de las gzan pa skal pa da^n ldan pa.rnams
kyi sems can gyi rgyud la gzigs nas cho 'phrul gsum
bstan pas bsam pa ji lta ba da^n/skal pa ji lta ba
bzin du ~nan thos kyi theg pa'i chos ~nd ston ci~n.../
24. I have summarized. In full translation, see
de Jong, Cinq chapitres, pp. 27-28.
25. Asanga: Mahaayaana-Suutraala.mkaara, edite
par Sylvain Levi (Paris, 1907), p. 52.
26. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 82.
27. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika, pp. 56-57.
28. Edward J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha (New
York: Barnes & Noble, 1952), p. 146.
29. The Expositor (Atthasaalinii), trans. Pe
Maung Tin, edited and revised by Mrs. Rhys Davids,
vol. 1 and 2 (London: Luzac & Company, 1958
reprint), 1:246; 2:318-319.
30. As cited by I. B. Horner, Buddhist Texts
Through the Ages, ed. by Edward Conze (Oxford: Bruno
Cassirer, 1954), pp. 68-69, and my summary.
31. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 125.
32. Here translated from the Tibetan in the
context of Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo,
`Discerning the Real' section.
33. For the various occurrences of the important
verse, see Louis de la Vallee Poussin,
Muulmadhyamakakaarikaas de Naagaarjuna avec la
Prasannapadaa Commentaire de Candrakiirti,
Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4 (St-Petersbourg,
1903-1913), p. 239.
34. Here I accept Matilal's correction of my
earlier stated position; confer, Bimal Krishna
Matilal, Epistemology. Logic, and Grammar in Indian
Philosophical Analysis (The Hague: Mouton, 1971),
p.. 148-149; hereafter cited as Matilal,
Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar. But now my
understanding only partially agrees with his, to
wit, "Dependent origination = Emptiness Dependent
designation = The Middle Way." Because I would say
that as far as Naagaarjuna is concerned, dependent
origination is the way things happen and that it is
voidness, while the dharmas so arising are void,
whether one recognizes this to be the case. But
while his school designates dependent origination
voidness, this is not what every other Buddhist sect
does; and Naagaarjuna goes on to add that the act of
so designating, when there is the dependence, is
indeed the middle path. So it is not voidness that
is designation.
35. Here I have taken suggestions from the
context of the Lam rim chen mo when MK I, 1 is
cited, and from the annotational comments of the
Tibetan work called Mchan bzi.
36. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp.
168-169.
37. Confer, David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The
Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The
University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5, 46. For
the theory of the Buddhist logicans as later
expressed by Ratnakiirti, see Surendranath Dasgupta,
A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1932), 1:158-159. This
is a theory that 'efficiency' (arthakriyaakaaritva)
can produce anything, and so a momentary, efficient
entity is the 'other' from which something may
arise. The stream of consciousness is held to be of
this nature, with one 'moment' of consciousness
giving rise to the next one. Hereafter cited as
Kalupahana, Causality.
P.20
38. Murti: The Central Philosophy, p. 170.
misused the term asatkaaryavaada (for the correct
usage, see below).
39. A History of Indian Philosophy, 1:320.
40. Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Critique of Indian
Realism (Agra: Agra University, 1964). p. 236.
41. See now Kalupahana. Causality, pp. 25ff. for
a valuable discussion of the svabhaavavaada in
connection with the ancient Materialists, and on p.
31 he admits for them the appelation
`non-causationists' (ahetuvaada).
42. The Tattvasa^ngraha of `Saantarak.sita with
Commentary of Kamala`siila, trans. by Ganganatha
Jha, vol. 2 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1939), pp.
887-888.
43. Cf. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 81; and K. N.
Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp.473--474.
44. While the verse in Sanskrit has the locative
plural dharme.su rather than vastu.su,
Candrakiirti's commentary makes it clear that the
latter word is intended, because he promptly talks
of the fourteen avyaak.rta-vastuuni and does not
mention any dharma-s; while in the Tibetan
translation of the verse, instead of the standard
translation for dharma (T. chos), one finds the term
d^nos po, which is frequently used to translate
vastu; confer, Takashi Hirano, An Index to the
Bodhicaryaavataara Pa~njikaa, Chapter IX (Tokyo:
Suzuki Research Foundation. 1966), pp.273-276.
45. Edward J. Thomas. The History of Buddhist
Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963
reprint), p. 124, states that they are actually
four, but become fourteen by stating them in
different ways.
46. My translation 'should not infer' is for the
Sanskrit nohyate. The verb uub- has a number of
meanings, including 'to infer': and the latter
meaning is more associated with the verb root when
there is the prefix abhi, with such a form as
abhyuuhya `having infrred'.
47. This conclusion, however, goes against
various speculative solutions that have been
advanced to determine particular schools to go with
the various denials applied to existence, namely,
those of Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge, pp. 243ff.; Murti, The Central
Philosophy, pp. 130-131; K. V. Ramanan,
Naagaarjuna's Philosophy (Vanarasi: Bharatiya Vidya
Prakashan, 1971), pp. 155-158. It is noteworthy that
there is little agreement between these authors'
solutions, and their arbitrariness itself stems
from human reason, while to counter such positions
Naagaarjuna would also have had to use ordinary
human reason.
48. The Ratnagotravibhaaga
Mahaayaanottaratantra`saastra, ed. E. H, Johnston
(Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950). pp. 10-11;
Confer, also Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the
Ratnagotravibhaaga (Uttaratantra) (Roma: Istituto
Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), pp.
163-166.
49. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 129.
50. Murti, The Central Philosophy, p. 126.
51. Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in
Religion Meaning (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press,
1967), p. 149.
52. The passage is translated in the context of
its citation in Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo. It
is number 69 in A. Stael-Holstein, ed.,
Kaa`syapaparivarta, (Commercial Press, 1926), but
original Sanskrit is not extant for this passage.
53. Referred to in note 1, herein. There were
many Tibetan controversies on this issue.
54. J. W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute
in the Madhyamaka school, " Journal of Indian
Philosophy 2 (1972): 1-6.
55. The passage occurs in the Tibetan Tanjur,
photo edition. vol. 98, pp. 151-2-3 to 151-2-7,
immediately preceded by Candrakiirti's citation of
MK XV, 1-2. I have translated it in Lam rim chen mo
context.
56. While it is not possible to deal here with
the many misconceptions in Ives Waldo, "Naagaarjuna
and Analytic Philosophy," Philosophy East and West
25, no. 3 (July, 1975), one may observe that
Candrakiirti's passage directly contradicts his
remarks (p. 283) that the acceptance of `relational
conditions' (pratyaya) entails a denial both of
svabhaava and of nonrelational 'significant events'.
Because Candrakiirti accepts, as does Buddhism
generally. the pratyaya in the causal chain of
Dependent Origination, and yet he also insists here
upon the svabhaava as well as on a significance (the
bodhisattva's goal) that is perhaps nonrelational.
57. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 82.
58. Robinson, book review, p. 76.
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59. This is well stated in the Tibetan language
by Red-mda'-ba's Commentary to AAryadeva's `Four
Hundred Verses', ed. Jetsun Rendawa Shonnu Lodo
(Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1974), p. 170. "The
form and variety of natures (dharma) are posited as
different by dint of sa.mj~naa (notions, ideas), but
not by reason of the own-form (svaruupa) of given
things (vastu)--because all of them being illusory,
it is not possible to distinguish their own-forms."
60. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar,
pp. 162-167.
61. Frits Staal, Exploring Mysticism (London:
Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 45-47; hereafter cited as
Staal, Exploring Mysticism.
62. Confer, Dhirendra Sharma, The Negative
Dialectics of India (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), p.
94; note where the example illustrates the Vedaanta
authority (pramaa.na) caalled 'presumption'
(arthaapatti).
63. For Naagaarjuna's classification of the two
members, nos. 2 and 10, as karma, see, for example,
A. Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination," History
of Religions 10, no. 3 (Feb., 1971):188. I have gone
much more into the cause and effect (hetu-phala)
side of the formula in my forthcoming "Dependent
Origination--the Indo-Tibetan Tradition," (special
issue of Journal of Chinese Philosophy).
64. Staal, Exploring Mysticism, p.47.
65. La Vallee Poussin, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas,
pp. 263.5 to 264.4.
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